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Summary 
 
This master thesis is a study of the burgeoning subscription-based crowdfunding model. 
Currently, this model of crowdfunding had been relegated as a subcategory of reward-based 
crowdfunding. However, one of the main purposes of this paper is to propose that subscription-based 
crowdfunding is functionally different from reward-based crowdfunding and thus deserving its own 
categorization alongside other community crowdfunding (reward-based crowdfunding and donation 
crowdfunding). The other purpose of this paper is to study the circumstances which fostered the growth 
of subscription-based crowdfunding. 
Unlike reward-based crowdfunding where backers contribute to fundraisers in a singular 
transaction, subscription-based crowdfunding allows backers (Patrons) to contribute to fundraisers 
(Creator) in an ongoing basis. This slight change in mechanism fundamentally changed the function of 
subscription-based crowdfunding and sets this model apart from the others. This form of crowdfunding 
is also based on the traditional pay membership or subscription services such as newspapers and 
magazines. However, by combining traditional subscription payment with the crowdfunding model, it 
became something more than a simple subscription service. 
 The current online media was powered financially by advertising. Due to the abundance of 
information on the internet, advertisers were able to attain higher negotiation power. In order for online 
content creators to thrive, they must attain scale in viewership. The value of a creator’s fan base is only 
the numbers. This revenue model is exemplified by YouTube, one of the largest and most dominant 
platforms for online videos. Over the course of its development, YouTube had to balance its relationship 
with advertisers and its content creators. The tension between the parties came to a head in 2017 in an 
event known as the “adpocalypse” when large number of brands withdrew from the platform due to 
alleged advertisements appearing on controversial contents. In turn, YouTube implemented mass 
demonetization and harsh filtering policies reduce controversial contents on its platform, this put many 
content creators’ career on the platform at financial risks and hardship.  
During this time, more creators started to join Patreon, one of the most popular subscription-
based crowdfunding platforms, to redirect their core fans to financially support their work with periodic 
pledges. As the subscription-based crowdfunding model provides an alternative revenue stream for 
content creators, Patreon and this crowdfunding model drew more mainstream attention. Starting from 
late 2017, many established players launched their version of subscription-based crowdfunding, such as 
Kickstarter’s Drip and YouTube’s channel membership program.  
This thesis explores this new phenomenon and provides a comprehensive understanding 
regarding subscription-based crowdfunding. The paper will differentiate subscription-based 
crowdfunding from reward-based crowdfunding in function and risks. It will also seek to show 
subscription-based crowdfunding’s relation to online mediascape and how this form of crowdfunding 
provides a new way of content financing that may prove to be the start of a major industry shift.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION  
SECTION 1. MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND 
Since the early 2000s, with ArtistShare being the first online reward-based crowdfunding 
platform (Freedman and Nutting, 2015), the online crowdfunding platforms had become an ever 
increasingly accessible alternative for entrepreneurial financing. Kickstarter (www.kickstarter.com), 
founded in 2009, had successfully launched more than 144,000 projects as of the time of writing (Stats, 
2018). Indiegogo, another prominent crowdfunding platform, founded in 2008, stated it launched an 
approximately 19,000 projects per month (Indiegogo, 2018). Most of the prominent and established 
online crowdfunding platforms were built on the basis of singular fundraising for single time projects, or 
also known as reward-based. Consequently, most academic studies into the field of online crowdfunding 
had been about reward-based crowdfunding models, and their impact on early stage entrepreneurial 
financing.  
As the internet became a more connected and popular space, artists, authors, and other media 
content creators, often collectively referred to as content creators, saw an opportunity to bring their 
talents to a worldwide audience and to capitalize on their work to sustain their livelihood (Madden, 
2004). Many creators started building audience and branding on online media platforms such as 
YouTube. Yet as the internet matures and becomes more incorporated into the mainstream, content 
creators soon saw that online media is not as liberating as before (Jakulin, 2017). The current main 
source of capitalizing on media content online is advertising which poses potential creative restrictions 
for content creators. Advertising revenue model also pay according to the scale of viewership which is 
often difficult for niche creators who do not have the scale needed (Anderson, 2016). Further, the 
existing reward-based crowdfunding model is not suitable for content creators that produce periodic 
contents such as episodic videos, serial publications and other forms of frequent uploads.  
These unmet needs have thus spun a new model of crowdfunding which will, for the purpose of 
this thesis, be referred to as subscription-based crowdfunding. Due to the recency of this new model, 
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existing academic literature has yet to produce significant studies on this subject. Furthermore, the rising 
popularity of this model has urged the need for an overarching analysis into the dynamics of 
subscription-based crowdfunding model, and how this compares with that of the established reward-
based crowdfunding model.  
SECTION 2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
The objective of this paper is to conduct an exploratory research on the subscription-based 
crowdfunding model, mainly from the perspective of Patreon, which is the biggest subscription-based 
crowdfunding platform as of the time of writing. This paper will also explore how subscription-based 
crowdfunding model is distinct enough to be a separate category from the reward-based crowdfunding 
model. To this end, this article attempts to address the following research questions:  
(1) How does subscription-based crowdfunding fulfill the unmet needs of the current revenue model for 
content creators? 
(2) What are the fundamental concepts of subscription-based crowdfunding? 
(3) What are the similarities and differences between the reward-based crowdfunding model, such as 
Kickstarter, and the subscription-based crowdfunding model, such as Patreon?  
SECTION 3. INTENDED AUDIENCE AND IMPACT 
As of the writing of this thesis, a quick search for “subscription-based crowdfunding” on 
Google Scholars yielded 316 results with only 1 result specifically on subscription-based crowdfunding. 
In comparison to a quick search for “crowdfunding”, a term only first cited in 2006 (Startups.co, 2014), 
it yielded 47,300 results in Google Scholars. This indicates the lack of academic studies on this new 
subset of crowdfunding, known as subscription-based crowdfunding. To address this gap, this article 
shall serve as an initial foray into the subject of subscription-based crowdfunding to help establish a 
foundation for future scholars to expand upon and aspiring entrepreneurs to reference.  
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SECTION 4. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
This thesis is designed as an exploratory research with a phenomena-based approach to address 
the relatively unexplored field of crowdfunding. The paper will first review existing academic literatures 
on reward-based crowdfunding to establish a fundamental understanding of the crowdfunding model. 
Then, a comprehensive exploration of YouTube, and how it shaped the online peer-generated video 
content sphere and revenue system, will be conducted based on a mix of academic literature, industry 
reports, news reports and market trend analysis. This literature review will serve to provide readers a 
general concept of both reward-based crowdfunding and YouTube, and draw the relations between these 
2 spheres. Upon laying down the circumstances that contributed to the growth of subscription-based 
crowdfunding, the author will compare the three funding models: reward-based crowdfunding, 
advertising-based revenue, and subscription-based crowdfunding models. With these main findings, this 
study aims to tie the first two aforementioned models together and show how they attribute to the rise of 
the subscription-based crowdfunding model. This paper will conclude by discussing the implications for 
research and practice, limitations inherent to this study, and possible future research directions. 
SECTION 5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
As an exploratory study, the goal of this paper is to investigate the concept and dynamics of 
subscription-based crowdfunding, a relatively unexplored, yet emerging type of crowdfunding. A 
comparative analysis of this type of crowdfunding against the well-studied and popular reward-based 
crowdfunding will be conducted. These methods are appropriate because, as of the writing of this paper, 
existing academic literature on subscription-based crowdfunding is still lacking in comparison to 
reward-based crowdfunding, and therefore has not been clearly defined.  
The author will first review crowdfunding in general, followed by a comprehensive review of 
the literatures on reward-based crowdfunding to provide a basis for the comparative analysis. Since 
online video content sphere is closely linked with subscription-based crowdfunding, and YouTube being 
the key platform for the online video ecology, this paper will also conduct a comprehensive analysis of 
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YouTube, its revenue model and how it contributed to the emergence of the subscription-based 
crowdfunding model. Basic research on subscription-based crowdfunding will be conducted based on 
the information given on Patreon, online articles/news reports, vlogs and online interviews.  
The author will use non-participant observation as a data collect method to extensively and 
directly understand the crowdfunding platforms in its current and natural state. To obtain a reliable 
perspective on the two crowdfunding methods, data will be extracted from Kickstarter and Patreon, 
which are the largest reward-based and subscription-based crowdfunding platforms, respectively. 
Valuable information about crowdfunding campaigns will be extracted directly from these sites as they 
are openly-accessible.          
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
SECTION 1. DEFINITION OF CROWDFUNDING 
The concept of crowdfunding stemmed from crowdsourcing, a term coined by journalist Jeff 
Howe in a June 2006 Wired article, in which information, solutions and other inputs for a project are 
sourced from a large pool of networked individuals who are not fully employed by said project (called 
the “crowd”; Howe, 2018); or as Schenk and Guittard (2009) had so succinctly put it, “outsourcing to the 
crowd”. In the case of crowdfunding, the goal is to raise the financial resources for a project by pitching 
to a crowd.    
While the term “crowdfunding” is only coined in 2006 (Green, 2015), the raising of funds by 
way of relatively small donations from multiple and often individual investors to finance a clearly stated 
enterprise with or without returns, is not a new concept. In 1713, Alexander Pope sought to finance his 
passion project of translating and publishing a book spanning 6 volumes of ancient Greek poetry solely 
by individual contributions (Kazmark, 2013; Stephen), who were in turn promised a copy of the finished 
work. Pope‟s crowdfunded works, especially his translation of Homer‟s Iliad, was successful and still 
remain a classic today. For a more recent example, in 1987, the then 18-year-old Mike Hayes 
successfully raised enough money for university tuition by appealing to readers of the Chicago Tribune 
to send him a penny by post (Braswell, 2014). The pre-internet examples of crowdfunding were such 
novelty due to barriers to communication and financial transaction. Pope‟s project was funded mostly 
through social circles he was part of and information was disseminated through limited printed 
advertisements and word of mouth. Although Hayes‟ crowdfunding was at the end successful, he had 
doubted the viability of his campaign as it would cost a donor 22 cents on postage to mail Hayes the one 
penny he appealed for. However, with the advent of the internet, networked global communication and 
expansion of online payment had brought the concept of crowdfunding from a novelty idea to a viable 
alternative for financing projects (Cichy and Gradoń, 2016).  
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Crowdfunding has recently become a valuable alternative source of venture financing, distinct 
from traditional forms of entrepreneur financing, such as professional investors and personal connections 
(Belleflamme et al., 2014). It has allowed entrepreneurs to circumvent problems related to finding funds 
from bank loans and equity capital (Cosh et al., 2009). Crowdfunding‟s global total funding volume 
grew from 2.7 billion USD in 2012 to an estimated 34.4 billion USD in 2015 (Cfxtrading, 2016). 
Modern crowdfunding has evolved to become almost unrecognizable from its pre-internet form. Indeed, 
with its popularity and potential, many academics have tried to define this phenomenon in a clearer 
manner. Belleflamme et al. (2014) defined crowdfunding as “an open call, mostly through the internet, 
for the provision of financial resources either in the form of donation or in exchange”. In addition, 
Mollick (2014) focused on the entrepreneurial aspect of crowdfunding and defined it as “... the efforts by 
entrepreneurial individuals and groups – cultural, social, and for-profit – to fund their ventures by 
drawing on relatively small contributions from a relatively large number of individuals using the internet, 
without standard financial intermediaries”. Modern crowdfunding is irrevocably intertwined with the 
internet and crowdfunding platforms were created to link fund-seeking entrepreneurs with potential 
investors.  
Crowdfunding activity is usually conducted through online platforms, such as Kickstarter, 
Gofundme, and Lendingtree. These platforms would often cater to a specific type of crowdfunding 
and/or industry. Crowdfunding is commonly classified into the following 4 categories (Wilson and 
Testoni, 2014): 
1. Donation-based, where donors contribute for altruistic reasons and do not receive any monetary 
or material returns for their contribution. Notable examples of donation-based crowdfunding 
platform are Gofundme and Youcaring. 
2. Reward-based, where investors would fund project proposals and receive goods or services once 
the project is successfully funded and completed. Notable examples include Kickstarter, 
Rockethub, and Makuake.  
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3. Lending-based, also known as peer-to-peer lending, where lenders would finance a project with 
stated rate of return and maturity rate in exchange for regular interest payment. Notable 
examples of such platform are Lending Club where it facilitates unsecured personal loans online. 
4. Equity-based, where people would fund an enterprise in exchange for a share, akin to joint-stock 
companies. In many cases, the most notable example is Indiegogo Ventures, an intermediary 
agent, usually an accredited financial institute, that would serve to provide some level of due 
diligence for prospective investors prior to the investment.  
 
The former two, donation-based and reward-based crowdfunding, are grouped as community 
crowdfunding; the latter two, lending-based and equity-based, are categorized as financial crowdfunding. 
The difference being that community crowdfunding does not provide financial returns whereas financial 
crowdfunding provides investors with yield or return on investment (Wilson and Testoni, 2014). 
Financial crowdfunding is also often subjected to higher levels of governmental oversight, and platforms 
may be required to register with governmental agencies such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission…, 2017). 
The real world applications and financial implications of crowdfunding for small businesses and 
entrepreneurship are optimistic. As opposed to traditional financing, crowdfunding‟s decentralized 
nature provides alternative ways for entrepreneurs to bypass gatekeepers and appeal to the crowd who 
are motivated to invest based on shared conviction or interests (Vitins, 2012). Traditional venture 
financing venues, such as venture capital or angel investors, do not represent the diversity of today‟s 
connected global consumer market (Brush et al., 2014). Research indicated that investors or decision 
makers are more likely to invest in projects they can personally relate to (Hewlett et al., 2013). This is 
further exacerbated after the recent financial crisis, where banks and other traditional establishments 
were more conservative in funding new ventures (Hempell and Kok, 2010).  
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On the other hand, crowdfunding can tap into not only the underutilized financial resource of 
the common person but also the diversity of a large globalized market. People can contribute to the 
realization of innovations that they support. From high tech product research and development, like 
Oculus VR (Chen, 2016), to humble neighborhood coffee shops (Houck, 2015), entrepreneurs are now 
able to reach out directly to potential end users, not just to provide the funding needed but also to prove 
product/market fit for niches overlooked by large financial establishments.  
SECTION 2. REWARD-BASED CROWDFUNDING 
Reward-based crowdfunding has gained a lot of mainstream attention in recent years, with many 
high profile successes such as Oculus Rift virtual reality device and Pebble smartwatches (Kerrigan, 
2018). Reward-based crowdfunding democratized the entrepreneurial finances by allowing 
entrepreneurs, thereafter referred to as fundraisers, to pitch their ideas directly to the crowd, and 
thereafter referred to as backers (Mollick and Robb, 2016).  For the purpose of this paper, the author will 
use Kickstarter as a representative when discussing the reward-based crowdfunding model due to its 
mainstream popularity as well as being one of the most explored platforms by academic literatures.  
Reward-based crowdfunding, also known as pre-ordering or pre-selling crowdfunding (Vulkan, 
2016), is a form of crowdfunding that allows backers to contribute to project proposals in return for 
rewards when the project is completed. As opposed to donation-based crowdfunding, the distinguishing 
draw of reward-based crowdfunding is the promise of receiving actual goods and/or services proposed 
by the fundraiser, though depending on the reward tiers, a token donation to show support but not 
receive any tangible returns is possible.  
Reward-based crowdfunding activity takes place on a mediating platform, in this case 
Kickstarter. The platform serves as a hub for fundraisers to propose their projects to the crowd free of 
charge. It is common practice for reward-based crowdfunding platforms to publish project proposals 
with little to no screening. In the project proposal, also known as a “campaign”, the fundraiser will set a 
target funding goal as well as a deadline. Fundraisers are encouraged to provide as much details about 
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the project as possible, including but not limited to: how they plan to achieve it, project timeline 
(including estimated delivery date), video introductions, prototype demonstrations and team background. 
In addition, fundraisers would set reward schemes. While reward-based crowdfunding is often described 
to be a pay-what-you-want model, platforms often encourage fundraisers to set clear and distinctive 
reward tiers as the proposal‟s reward scheme to encourage backers to contribute more. (Giudici et al., 
2012)  
Reward schemes are divided into tiers. Ordered from the lowest value to the highest, reward 
tiers are the different amounts of contributions backers can pay to receive a corresponding reward 
(Kickstarter, 2018a). While the product proposed by the fundraiser is the main reward for the scheme, 
the tier system allows fundraisers the flexibility to maximize potential contributions by price 
discrimination (Benson, 2013). Backers can contribute to the amount they want to pay for the specific 
level of reward they wish to get upon the fruition of the project. Here it is important to distinguish the 
difference between the completion of the project and the completion of the crowdfunding campaign. A 
campaign is the period of time, usually 2 to 4 weeks (Wood, 2015), in which the crowd can become 
backers of the project. Upon deadline, if the amount raised exceeds the goal set by the fundraiser, the 
campaign is considered successful; the platform takes a fee of 5% of total amount raised as well as a 3% 
to 5% payment processing fee, the rest is transferred to the fundraiser (Kickstarter, 2018c). 
Crowdfunding platforms can be divided into “keep it all” or “all or nothing” when it comes to the receipt 
of funds (Cumming et al, 2015). While most platforms allow the fundraiser to receive any amount after 
passing the set goal, some platforms such as Indiegogo allows fundraisers to have the option to keep 
however much they raised at the end of the campaign, regardless of whether the total funded amount 
reached the goal or not. (Hurst, 2014) 
Section 2.1. Incentives of fundraisers 
There are many reasons for choosing crowdfunding over other forms of venture financing, as it 
can offer unique support for entrepreneurs on multiple levels. According to De Buysere et al. (2012), “no 
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other investment form, be it debt or equity, can provide the benefits of pre-sales, market research, word-
of-mouth promotion, and crowd wisdom without additional cost.” Benefits that fundraisers get from 
crowdfunding go beyond simply covering financial needs (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Hsu, 2004). In 
one study, it was found that although 90% of fundraisers use crowdfunding for “raising money”, up to 
85% and 60% of fundraisers use crowdfunding to “get public attention” and “obtain feedback for their 
product and services”, respectively (Gabison, 2014).  
The most obvious incentive for fundraiser to use reward-based crowdfunding is the financing 
aspect. Yet, this by itself is also multi-faceted. Financial support is an evident benefit for not only 
smaller campaigns that often seek to raise less than $1000 (Mollick, 2014), but it has also been proven to 
be advantageous to ventures seeking for seed capital (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Schwienbacher and 
Larralde, 2010). For example, there were 45 out of 50 funded projects on Kickstarter in 2012 that 
successfully got spun into firms (Mollick, 2014). By using crowdfunding to raise money, fundraisers 
also have the additional benefit of having the freedom to make decisions on their own and own the start-
up, which is otherwise impossible if the fund is obtained from traditional methods (Macht and 
Weatherston, 2014).  
Some entrepreneurs may not use crowdfunding platform just for the sake of raising money from 
the crowd. Some entrepreneurs take advantage of the crowdfunding platform to prove the attractiveness 
of their proposed product to secure more funding, possibly from traditional sources such as business 
angels and banks. One such goal of using crowdfunding was for the Pebble “smart watch”, whereby 
funding was originally rejected by venture capitals but eventually succeeded in securing a large amount 
of venture capital funding after launching a successful campaign on Kickstarter (Dingman, 2013).         
Crowdfunding increases exposure of a product or service; it helps promote a brand or campaign 
to a larger, international audience. Press and media attention usually follows after the launch of a 
crowdfunding campaign, which helps quickly build network and backer‟s attention. More than 12 
million people from over 177 countries have previously backed a Kickstarter campaign (Evans and 
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Davies, 2014) and therefore pitching your idea on Kickstarter may help you reach these potential 
investors and consumers. By reaching out to such a geographically diverse crowd, fundraisers can also 
make use of the platform as a free market research opportunity to evaluate the potential success of post-
campaign sales and in which part of the world their product or service will be most appealing. Crowd 
interest in a campaign can also signal to fundraisers about the potential success of a project, allowing 
them to evaluate whether or not to continue to invest time, effort and resources (Mollick, 2014).           
Section 2.2. Incentives of backers 
As for backers, there are many reasons for one to commit financial resources to a reward-based 
crowdfunding campaign. As reward-based crowdfunding campaigns often are about bringing a product 
into a market, it would be easy to see it as simply a pre-ordering scheme. However, research has shown 
that this is not always the case. Given that reward-based crowdfunding has inherent risks higher than 
conventional pre-ordering schemes, why do backers still invest in this form of crowdfunding 
projects?  According to Gerber and Hui (2013) and Steigenberger (2017), backers‟ motivation to support 
reward-based crowdfunding campaigns can be separated into three broad groups: consumption, altruism, 
and social belonging.  
 
Consumption 
Several studies that investigated the behaviors of backers showed that one reason behind the decision to 
support a campaign lies on the “expected utility derived from consumption of the product to be 
developed” (Steigenberger, 2017) or the reward obtained in return for the financial support provided 
(Adner and Zemsky, 2006; Bellaflamme et al., 2014; Gerber and Hui, 2013). Most reward-based 
crowdfunding campaigns reward backers by offering their products at a discounted rate of the 
envisioned market price, making it an attractive option for early adopters (Mollick, 2014). Some 
fundraisers may even provide backers with product customization, which is a service that may not be 
available when the product is on the market in the future (Colombo et al., 2015). Since reward-based 
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crowdfunding allows two-way communication between backers and fundraisers, backers have the ability 
to provide feedback and influence the product development process, and therefore increase the expected 
utility derived from consumption (Ordanini et al., 2011; Gerber and Hui, 2013; Colombo et al., 2015) To 
further increase the total amount of funds provided my backers, fundraisers sometimes promise to 
provide additional rewards once a certain collective goal has been reached (Steigenberger, 2017).      
 
Altruism 
While many backers are motivated to “receive” rewards, others are motivated to “give”, and this is 
where altruism comes in as a potential motive to fund a reward-based crowdfunding campaign.  Even 
when there is no physical reward associated, donating to support a campaign for the development of a 
potentially useful product has been shown to be psychologically rewarding for backers (Andreoni, 1990; 
Henderson and Malani, 2009). As Harbaugh (1998) explains it, backers with altruistic behaviors are 
indirectly “buying” what has been called „„warm glow”, which refers to the internal satisfaction that 
emerges from the act of contributing to something that one believes has a good cause. However, 
sometimes backers‟ decision to support a campaign might not be simply to support a cause, but rather to 
support a specific person or group out of sympathy or social relationships (Ordanini et al., 2011; Gerber 
and Hui, 2013; Colombo et al., 2015). Knowing a fundraiser personally also helps in making a decision 
to support a campaign because backers may obtain more information about the project, therefore 
decreasing the information asymmetry between the backers and fundraisers (Gerber and Hui, 2013).   
 
Social belonging 
In addition to the above motives to “receive” or “give”, crowdfunding also provides backers a feeling of 
being part of a community of like-minded people. Some backers may even stay and participate in these 
communities because their initial drive for participating has turned into a hobby (Shah, 2006). Being part 
of these communities also gives backers the opportunity to have a say in the design of the final product. 
 13   
 
This motivation plays an especially important role for the support of products that are very much in need 
but still lacking on the market. There seems to be a common motive among supporters of charity and 
crowdsourcing, that is to obtain social prestige within a group (Harbaugh, 1998; Nambisan and Baron, 
2009). Interestingly, a study by Gerber and Hui (2013) suggests that this motive might also play an 
important role in driving backers to support reward-based crowdfunding campaigns.       
SECTION 3. YOUTUBE: A MAJOR PLATFORM FOR CONTENT CREATORS 
Section 3.1. Rise of YouTube 
With the increasing number of people utilizing social media sites like YouTube for both 
information and entertainment, digital content creation is on the rise. In a report on selected countries
1
, 
representing 65% of the world‟s population, 66% of all individuals will own a smartphone in 2018 with 
many developed nations having an 80% or above market penetration (Zenith, 2017). In the same report, 
73% of all time spent on internet will be on mobile devices. With 63% of digital content creators using 
YouTube and Vimeo as their medium (Elder, 2017), and with YouTube having 76.86% of the online 
video platform market share (Datanyze, 2018), YouTube has significant influence on the sphere of 
online content creation.  
Headquartered in San Bruno, California, YouTube was founded in 2005 and acquired by 
Google in 2006 (Sorkin and Peters, 2006). Created during the cusp of the rise of online social network, 
YouTube realized early on the importance of networking effect in the platform business. YouTube 
encouraged member registration through incentives such as the Nano-a-Day-Giveaway, where YouTube 
would give out one free iPod Nano everyday by registering, inviting friends or uploading video, as well 
as features such as sharing videos, friend list, creator channel and subscription (Youtube, 2005). 
                                                            
1 The 52 countries included in the source report are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, South 
Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Ukraine, the UK and the USA, representing 65% of the world‟s 
population. 
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However, it was clear since its inception that YouTube had a creator-focused approach. Features such as 
monthly video contests and video response function encouraged users to contribute to the video content 
of the platform and foster a connected creator community. YouTube made a significant move by 
piggybacking on Myspace, allowing people to easily embed videos on their Myspace 
(Platformthinkinglabs, 2015). Myspace was not just the biggest social network website in early 2000s 
but also a hotbed of music band engagement (Nardo, 2016). Thanks to YouTube‟s ease of use, bands 
would upload their music and videos on YouTube and share the videos on Myspace, thus accumulating 
YouTube‟s mass of content, creator and recognition. By 2006, YouTube held 29% of US multimedia 
entertainment market, had 20 million unique users per month, and accounted for 60% of all videos 
watched online (Reuters, 2006).  
In October 2006, Google acquired YouTube for $1.65 billion USD (La Monica, 2006). The 
acquisition marked the platform‟s shift from homecasting to broadcasting (Cunningham et al., 2016), 
where the business actively moved away from its original focus on community-based social networking 
to become more viewership based (Van Dijck, 2013). From this point on, YouTube transform from an 
amateur media platform to a legitimate institution in the media entertainment industry (Cunningham et 
al., 2016). By tapping into Google‟s technological and financial resources, YouTube was able to 
legitimize itself in the entertainment industry in multiple ways.  
First, YouTube implemented measures to professionalize its user content creators. The Partner 
Program, which started in May 2007 (Biggs, 2007), offered qualified content creators a percentage of 
advertising income generated from advertisements placed on the page of the creator‟s content. These 
advertisements include display ads, overlay ads, bumper ads and various forms of embedded video ads 
(Youtube, 2018d). To further incentivize content creators to turn video making into a profession, 
YouTube categorizes all content creators, whether partners or not, into tiers: Graphite (1 to 1000 
subscribers), Opal (1000 to 10,000 subscribers), Bronze (10,000 to 100,000 subscribers), Silver and 
above (100,000 subscribers or more) (Youtube, 2018b). Each tier unlocks increasing benefits and 
 15   
 
support from YouTube that would help creators improve the quality of their videos, such as online 
lessons on how to abide copyright regulations, events and workshops on building audiences, video 
editing and filming techniques at physical venues called YouTube Space and accessing professional 
production facilities in YouTube Space (Youtube, 2018a). For Silver and above, YouTube will 
distinguish creators with Creator Awards, physical plaques commemorating the respective milestones 
(Youtube, 2018b); Silver Creator Award for surpassing 100,000 subscribers, Gold Creator Award for 
reaching 1 million subscribers, and in 2015, a Diamond Creator Award was made available for selected 
creators who have over 10 million subscribers (Brouwer, 2015). Along with the plaque and a 
congratulatory letter from YouTube, additional gifts may be included to further aid the creator‟s channel. 
According to a recipient of a Silver Creator Award in 2013, the package he received also included a gift 
card with the stated intention from YouTube to help invest in production equipment upgrade 
(Cutlerylover, 2013).  
Second, to transform itself from a fringe internet video haven for pirated content to a legitimate 
player in the media industry, YouTube dramatically improved copyright enforcement and created an ad 
friendly environment. Prior to Google‟s acquisition, YouTube had not been in the radar of established 
media companies despite their copyrighted content being illegally uploaded on the platform. During that 
time, the internet was still young but more importantly, YouTube was a small venture therefore 
companies knew that taking legal actions against it would be a waste of time and resources since the 
owners would not be able to pay much compensation (Kim, 2012). Once Google purchased YouTube, 
media companies started to sue YouTube for copyright infringement knowing that Google will be able to 
pay. The court case Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., highlighted the need for YouTube to 
address copyright issues promptly (Stempel, 2014).  
With increasing pressure from the industry, in 2007 YouTube introduced Video ID, a tool to 
help copyright holders find and claim any content that infringed their intellectual property. Combined 
with the later introduced Audio ID, YouTube introduced the Content ID tool in 2010, a complete and 
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constantly updating “copyright and right management tool” for copyright holders (Kim, 2012). This tool 
is only available for entities that applied for and qualified by YouTube (Youtube, 2018f). Content ID 
scans uploaded content for any copyright infringement and notifies the copyright holders (Youtube, 
2018d). Once notified, the copyright holders have 3 courses of action: block, track or monetize. 
Copyright owners may block the entire video from being viewed, mute the video, or restrict the video on 
certain platforms such as phones, websites or apps (Youtube, 2018g). The owners could also track the 
video‟s performance but not impose any actions. Finally, the copyright owner could monetize the 
claimed video, thus instead of the uploader earning the advertising revenue, it would be the copyright 
owner who benefits. In some cases, both the copyright owner and uploader/content creator could share 
the advertising revenue instead (Youtube, 2018g).  
By these 2 methods, YouTube fostered its own ecosystem of content creators that creates 
original video contents while allowing traditional media firms to also share in the convenience and profit 
of this popular online platform. In the matter of years YouTube merged with the existing media 
entertainment industry, and in many ways became one of the most dominant players in the market. 
YouTube is able to take advantage of its network effect to create a moat that blocks new market entrants. 
While Hulu and Netflix are gaining traction in the online streaming market (Morris, 2018; Vena, 2018), 
there is still no player that can challenge YouTube in providing a platform for independent video content 
creators.   
Section 3.2. Youtube‟s advertising-based revenue model 
YouTube‟s main source of revenue comes from selling advertising opportunities on its website. 
The revenue model is based the traditional advertising revenue metrics known as cost per thousand 
(CPM) (Leppänen, 2017).  In this metric, the platform (YouTube) charges advertisers a certain amount 
of money per 1,000 views of their advertisement. By utilizing Google‟s technological advantage in 
search algorithm, big data and machine learning, YouTube can provide targeted advertising to specific 
demographics and automated ad purchasing for advertisers on the platform (Google, 2017; Google, 
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2018). In essence, YouTube‟s machine-learning technology enabled seamless platform for advertisers to 
put their advertisements on available spaces to targeted demographics for the best price and best chances 
of viewer engagement possible at a scale previously impossible to achieve or imagine. (Cunningham et 
al., 2016) 
Different from traditional media entertainment industry, YouTube does not seek to own or co-
own any intellectual properties regarding the media on its platform, nor does it offer backend residual or 
profit participation for its content creators. These measures would only serve to fetter the scaling 
potential a democratized content publishing medium could achieve with administrative, legal, production 
and other operational obligations associated with traditional media companies. Instead, YouTube allows 
the copyright holder of the video content to enter into agreements where YouTube and the copyright 
holder split the advertising revenue (Cunningham et al., 2016). 
However, not everyone can get a share of advertising money immediately. Since May 2007, all 
users hoping to get a piece of the advertising money have to be members of the YouTube Partner 
Program. Though details about the inner workings of the algorithm and actual CPM amount are a closely 
guarded secret, industry estimated the CPM to be within 0.25 USD and 4 USD (Urgo, 2018). The actual 
CPM one could get depended on many factors such as geographic location of the viewer and creator, 
genre of the video, and degree of advertising friendliness (Schmoyer, 2016). These factors are 
determined by YouTube‟s algorithm which employed advanced artificial intelligence or machine 
learning to handle the sheer amount of content added to YouTube every day.  
As for content created by institutional media companies, such as Warner Bros. or Sony Music 
Entertainment, YouTube opted for an interesting management system. Broadcast networks that managed 
their own official YouTube channels for content distribution are often premium tier partners which 
follow similar advertising revenue schemes but it is strongly suggested by circumstantial evidence that 
premium tier partners have back channel negotiations for better policies (alexander, 2017).  
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Section 3.3. YouTube and its influence over content creators 
Given YouTube‟s massive market leadership and cultural relevance, it held tremendous sway 
over the fate of content creators‟ business and livelihood (Lagiovane, 2018). Coupled with its reliance on 
advertising revenue, YouTube had various controversies that caused tensions between its relationship 
with content creators and advertisers. The recent “adpocalypse”, when many companies pulled their 
advertisements from YouTube after finding out their advertisements were displayed on controversial 
videos, was perhaps one of the tipping points for many content creators to seek alternative revenue 
streams (Stanford, 2018).  
YouTube algorithm is a vital factor of YouTube content creators‟ success and even had a 
butterfly effect influencing the success of businesses outside of YouTube. YouTube‟s algorithm not only 
determines CPM but also YouTube videos‟ exposure to viewers, and in turn, affecting viewership count. 
Therefore, any change in its bias could promote one type or category of videos while shunning others. 
One such example would be in 2012 when YouTube‟s search engine optimization shifted from being 
view based to favor watch time, or how long a viewer watches the video (YouTube, 2012). According to 
an analysis done by a content creator and YouTube consultant, the previously dominant genres such as 
sketches, music covers and animation videos, which are generally shorter, declined in popularity and 
long form content such as compilation videos (videos that combined many but thematically related short 
clips into one long video) and lets plays (videos of video games played by YouTubers) shot up in 
popularity. The rising stars were all long form videos that could be produced daily and attracted viewers 
to binge watch (Patrick, 2017).  
Tension between YouTube, creators and advertisers came to a head in 2017 which is now 
known as the adpocalypse (Stanford, 2018). The adpocalyse is a series of events that started around 
March of 2017, and the term is a combination of advertisement and apocalypse as many content creators 
were afraid this may be the end of their career on YouTube. Due to Wall Street Journal‟s reporting of 
controversial content on YouTube, many advertisers and corporations began to pull their advertisements 
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from YouTube for fear of damaging their brand (Statt, 2017). In response, YouTube initiated a wave of 
policy changes and demonetization in which programs were employed to screen contents for potentially 
controversial contents (Sloane, 2017). During this period, many creators, including top YouTubers, 
suffered dramatic cut from their advertising revenue prompting many to seek out other sources of 
income to sustain business (Weiss, 2017). Many stars turned to their following to attain revenue directly 
from fans, such as moving their contents to Twitch, a livestream platform that allows fans to tip to 
creators, and Patreon, a subscription-based crowdfunding platform (Weiss, 2017). After this period, 
creators‟ trust with YouTube had been significantly damaged as creator felt YouTube was not 
transparent with their policies (Alexander, 2018). YouTube continued to enact many policy changes to 
bolster advertiser confidence, while content creators begin to diversify its revenue sources.   
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CHAPTER 3. FINDINGS 
SECTION 1. SUBSCRIPTION-BASED CROWDFUNDING: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE MECHANISMS 
This section will analyze the function and mechanisms of subscription-based crowdfunding, 
using Patreon as the point of reference. At the time of writing, Patreon is the most iconic subscription-
based crowdfunding platform, therefore a reasonable benchmark of the business model. In its most 
generic form, subscription-based crowdfunding shares similar functions and mechanisms as reward-
based crowdfunding (Canada Media Fund, 2018b). Nevertheless, this form of crowdfunding provides a 
certain degree of customizability and serves a markedly different market than reward-based 
crowdfunding or other forms of crowdfunding. Canada Media Fund defined subscription-based 
crowdfunding as such, “contributors finance a project or creator on an ongoing basis rather than through 
one-off donations.” (Canada Media Fund, 2018a) Following Patreon‟s example, in the context of 
subscription-based crowdfunding, the corresponding term for fundraiser is Creator while backer is 
Patron. This will serve to distinguish between the actors in the reward-based and subscription-based 
crowdfunding models. 
Patreon was founded by Jack Conte and Sam Yam on May 7, 2013 (Crunchbase, 2018). The 
objective of Patreon, according to Jack Conte, was to “...empower creators, to help them make what they 
want to make and say what they want to say” and that “with a transition to digital they have the 
publishing tools and the ability; it‟s just about financing it.” (Levitz, 2013) As Patreon, along with many 
members of the subscription-based crowdfunding community, is oriented towards artists, those who seek 
funding do not often see themselves as fundraisers or entrepreneurs; this business-like connotation is 
often applied to other forms of crowdfunding. Instead, fundraisers on subscription-based crowdfunding 
view themselves as content creators and their fans are not customers or investors but patrons of their 
content, a term referencing back to the art patronage system famous in Renaissance Europe 
(Hollingsworth, 2994).  
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Creators launch campaigns on the subscription-based crowdfunding platform to seek funding 
from the crowd on an ongoing basis. Similar to reward-based crowdfunding, Creators may create reward 
tiers and provide additional benefits for Patrons that contribute over certain levels of money per time. 
While subscription-based business such as newspapers often charge on a monthly basis, Patreon allows 
Creators to charge either by month or by creation. By-creation campaigns collect funds from Patrons 
only after each work is completed. This work could be a completed project such as a video, song or 
painting, or could be a major milestone for a larger project such as a major update for a program. 
Subscription-based crowdfunding platforms also take a percentage as service fee, just like reward-based 
crowdfunding platforms; financial institutes will also charge a processing fee to facilitate the transfer of 
money. Patreon, specifically, takes 5% service fee from all pledges while processing fee is estimated at 
5% as well (Patreon, 2018).   
While the monthly campaign is by far the most popular form of fund collection on Patreon, 
representing 77% of all campaigns compared to only 23% which were per-creation campaigns in 2016, 
per-creation campaigns provide additional flexibility for Creators (Church, 2016). As opposed to the 
more orthodox monthly campaign method, per-creation campaigns allow Creators to initiate fund 
collection from his/her Patrons when he/she makes a “paid post” with the work that was created. A 
Creator can make any number of paid posts per month. Patrons, however, can set a cap to the amount 
they will contribute. Depending on the Creator‟s business model, charging Patrons per creation may be 
more suitable than per month. Often, projects with more sporadic output frequency or output with clear 
and definitive nature would adopt this form of billing. As of 2016, the Music category had the highest 
percentage of per-creation campaigns (42%) and the Games category had the lowest (16%) (Church, 
2016). The reason behind could be that musicians often have a sporadic but shorter production period for 
each definitive result than game creators, where creating a full game could take years to create one 
finished game, not accounting for patching and updating the game after it is published.  
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Creators using Patreon to build their own exclusive membership service would set multiple 
reward tiers, each tier offering progressively more exclusive or better benefits such as early access to 
content, members-only content, online hangouts or having the Creator visit the Patron in real life. While 
there are campaigns that are completely exclusive, in which only Patrons have access to the output of the 
Creator; many if not most Creators produce publicly accessible output and Patreon campaign as extra 
contents for passionate fans. This is particularly prevalent with creators of episodic or periodic contents 
such as podcasts, videos, or webcomics. Campaigns that are purely exclusive and do not put out publicly 
available work are generally regarded as rare. Though this form is often used in niche groups such as, 
but not limited to, games, non-profit charities, or dance lessons.  
Other Creators opted to use Patreon like a tip jar, allowing fans the opportunity to become 
Patrons as a way to express appreciation and support (Sterling, 2018). Campaigns of this nature would 
either not have any reward tiers or just a singular $1 tier with no actual rewards or benefits from the 
Creator. The Creator will continue to produce content on his/ her preferred medium for the public free of 
charge. Maura Church, Patreon‟s data science manager, stated that data analysis indicated that, on 
average, this form of Patreon campaigns do not perform as well financially as the membership approach 
(Polich, 2017). In line with this finding, my investigation into the top 20 campaigns in each 14 
categories on Patreon shows that only 40 campaigns out of 280 have 1 or 0 reward tiers, with the 
Podcast category having more campaigns using the tip jar approach in the categorical top 20 than other 
categories. This suggests that the membership approach tends to outperform the tip jar approach. 
SECTION 2. ADVERTISING-BASED REVENUE MODEL VS. FAN-BASED 
REVENUE MODEL 
Online content market has always been very reliant on the advertising-based revenue model. 
The democratized nature of the internet meant easy access to publishing and lower barrier to enter; 
combined with the online content ecosystem being overly dependent on advertisers‟ money meant there 
is an imbalance in the dynamics. In fact, over the years, there has been a decrease in the price for online 
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ads and CPMs due to the oversaturation of media content compared to the amount of advertising needs. 
This was observed across the online mediascape as early as 2016 (Anderson, 2016). 
Often, the individual content creator possesses little control or bargaining power and therefore 
the victim in the dynamics between platform and advertisers. The content creator must grow a large 
scale audience to earn any meaningful income from advertisers, therefore must create content that the 
fans want. However, the advertisers, hoping to protect the brand, must make sure their advertisements 
are not shown on controversial contents. The platform, needing to appease advertisers, must create an 
ad-friendly environment within the platform, therefore enacts policies that in turn would impose creative 
restriction for the creators. The creators, having to change format or content, may therefore risk losing 
fans as they are no longer creating the type of contents the fans originally love. This tension between 
advertisers, platforms and content creators had been a point of grievance for some time but the recent 
adpocalypse publicized this issue and propelled it to mainstream awareness.  
Patreon, and by extension the current subscription-based crowdfunding sphere, had been a 
response to this issue. Jack Conte had wanted to improve the way “artists” are compensated (Conte, 
2017). Subscription-based crowdfunding has a more direct financial loop. The Patron contributes to the 
Creator to produce what the Patron likes. Also, with the average CPM at around 0.25 USD to 4 USD, 
each view is individually insignificant. In comparison with Patron, the lowest contribution is 1 USD per 
period, therefore 1 Patron is worth many thousand times more than a view. 
As a platform, YouTube has grown to a size where it is facing reverse network effects. With its 
popularity as an online video site and low barrier to entry, all manners of content creators will be 
entering YouTube. This meant YouTube must constantly and increasingly curate its contents or the 
platform may lose value (Lunn, 2009). This is seen in the case with the 2016 adpocalypse, where more 
than 250 brands pulled out their advertisements from the platform and was estimated to have costed 
Google 750 million USD in just the first wave (Rath, 2017). YouTube‟s curation had also been subject 
of controversy, as YouTube‟s algorithm tried to create an ad-friendly platform, many videos that are not 
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considered offensive are being demonetized or labelled not ad-friendly (Kain, 2017). Justified or not, 
this meant many creators have fluctuating CPMs or have their work demonetized due to changes in 
algorithm and policies.  
Subscription-based crowdfunding‟s direct financing loop gives Creators freedom to create 
content they want, or as Patreon stated, “predictable income from your patrons means you can create on 
your terms. No strings attached.” (Patreon, 2018) Unlike advertising-revenue model, subscription-based 
model does not require scale in viewership but is dependent on Creator‟s relationship with fans, 
therefore niche Creators with passionate fans can carve a living for themselves. One such example is 
InRangeTV which makes firearms-related content. This channel was constantly hit by demonetization as 
firearms are considered as not advertiser-friendly, so it stopped monetizing its videos and the channel is 
now completely funded by its small but ardent fans through Patreon (VICE News, 2018). Subscription-
based crowdfunding allows small and/or niche Creators to sustain their venture and without 
compromising their contents for advertisers.  
SECTION 3. SUBSCRIPTION-BASED CROWDFUNDING VS. REWARD-BASED 
CROWDFUNDING 
This section will explore the similarities and differences inherent between the two types of 
crowdfunding methods: reward-based and subscription-based. The dynamics involved in reward-based 
crowdfunding has already been widely explored in several studies (Belleflamme et al., 2014; Mollick, 
2014; Bi et al., 2017 Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2017; Steigenberger, 2017). By incorporating the 
findings in previous studies and an explorative research into the dynamics involved in subscription-
based crowdfunding, a comparative analysis will be presented and discussed. Although the two methods 
of crowdfunding may seem to be similar, the differences observed are substantial enough to allow one to 
conclude that subscription-based crowdfunding may be a new and distinct fundraising method from the 
more traditional reward-based crowdfunding method.   
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Section 3.1. Incentives  
While fundraisers and Creators both use their respective crowdfunding method and platform 
ostensibly for acquiring financial resources to sustain their projects from the crowd, the differences in 
the workings of the two models dictated a significant rift between the incentives of the parties involved. 
Why do some choose to put start a campaign on Kickstarter rather than Patreon? What, if any, is the 
difference in motivation between a backer and a Patron? This section will attempt to shed some light on 
the similarities and differences between the incentives involved in subscription-based crowdfunding and 
reward-based crowdfunding. 
First, as opposed to many projects on reward-based crowdfunding that uses the platform to raise 
seed capital to establish as legitimate firms or for startups to raise early stage finance (O'Kane, 2017), 
there are no notable examples of flipping a subscription-based crowdfunding campaign into a business. 
The nature of subscription-based crowdfunding is different to that of reward-based crowdfunding. 
Furthermore, for subscription-based crowdfunding, content creators are often established business such 
as the The Valleyfolk campaign (https://www.patreon.com/TheValleyfolk) or Chapo Trap House 
podcast (https://www.patreon.com/chapotraphouse). Content creators become Patreon creators to tap 
into a new line of revenue stream that is dependent not on advertisers but on their relationship and 
influence with their existing fans. In short, most reward-based crowdfunding campaigns uses capital to 
produce what essentially is a prototype mass production as a proof of concept for their idea; while most 
subscription-based crowdfunding campaigns have already proven their concept but are just diversifying 
their income stream to fund their project.  
Second, while fundraisers uses reward-based crowdfunding platforms to validate their ideas‟ 
product-market fit and gain publicity, Creators on subscription-based crowdfunding platform simply 
want to take advantage of a convenient and simple site to collect financial support from Patrons and 
engage exclusively with their most ardent fans. By its nature, reward-based crowdfunding projects are 
new and seek not just monetary resources but also market validation. The crowd utilizes the platform to 
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find new projects to support. This exploration aspect is not as dominant, if at all, in subscription-based 
crowdfunding. Most Creators do not pitch their venture with the crowdfunding platform, instead brings 
existing fans from their main medium of publishing to Patreon. As such, Creators utilize the platform 
more as a method to monetize their influence over their fan base; the stage where Creators convinces 
fans to consider becoming Patrons happens off the site. Unlike in reward-based crowdfunding, 
fundraisers utilize their respective platform as the main way to access potential backers. This difference 
is reflected in Patreon and Kickstarter‟s website layout. Patreon focuses on convincing content creators 
to start a Patreon page. Upon first entering Patreon‟s homepage, the visitor is greeted by the tagline 
“Creators, come get paid” in large font, with the rest of the page detailing the tools available for Creators 
and “transparent fees”; finally ending it with a large banner stating “Let‟s get you paid” and an orange 
icon to “start your page”. The “explore creators” page, features big and popular internet content creators 
that are Patreon Creators, and going into the 14 different categories only shows the top 20 campaigns of 
the respective categories. The only way to find Creators that are not featured or in the top 20 of each 
category is by searching with the search bar, which requires the inquirer to know the name of the Creator. 
This indicates that Patreon is not a site for the crowd to find Creators but for Creators to bring their fans 
in to become Patrons. This is heavily contrasted by Kickstarter‟s website layout where it features many 
ways to find projects that the visitors may like, such as access to trending projects, projects curated by 
Kickstarter, nearly funded projects as well as access to all projects of a certain category. The site is 
evidently design to be browsed. 
Third, while it is established that there is a portion of backers of reward-based crowdfunding 
campaigns that contribute because it gives them a feeling of belonging and community to people with 
similar interests (Steigenberger, 2017), this sense of belonging is far more influential in motivating 
Patrons to contribute to subscription-based crowdfunding projects (Steigenberger, 2017). In fact, Maura 
Church had stated in an interview that the key to a more financially successful subscription-based 
crowdfunding campaign is if the Creator actively engages with Patrons, and that this close relationship is 
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the main motivator for fans to become Patrons of their favorite content creators (Polich, 2017). This is 
further reinforced by a quick look of the benefits listed on many Creator‟s reward tiers. One of the most 
common rewards that Creators provide in exchange for the monetary support is fan recognition, which 
may be a simple featuring of Patrons‟ names at the end of one‟s video. For Philip DeFranco 
(https://www.patreon.com/DeFranco), Patrons can be credited at the end of each YouTube vlog for a 
support of 500 USD/month. The 400 USD/month price increase over the previous tier is driven entirely 
by fan recognition, suggesting that Patron engagement is an important incentive for Patron contribution. 
Another form of reward is to allow fans an exclusive access to the Creators‟ behind-the-scenes videos, 
which is a type of reward that RollPlay (https://www.patreon.com/RollPlay) provides in one of their tiers 
for paying 3 USD/month. To further lure fan engagement and trigger incentives to Patrons, Schmoes 
Know (https://www.patreon.com/schmoedown) has even provided a tier where a support of 2,500 
USD/month allows the Patron to be part of their show.  These are distinct from reward-based 
crowdfunding where backers are often more interested in the proposed product rather than the 
relationship with the fundraiser. This is observed with most reward tiers of most campaigns that promise 
physical products as the main draw. In short, the benefits offered by subscription-based crowdfunding 
campaigns are often more subjective and valuable to fans of the Creator, and benefits offered by reward-
based crowdfunding campaigns are more objective with evident market value. 
Section 3.2. Risks  
It is not without merit or reason that entrepreneurial financing had traditionally been 
concentrated and generally regarded as difficult (Lavinsky, 2010). Crowdfunding is a great way for the 
crowd to invest directly into new businesses and products across the globe, however backers are often 
unable to or incapable of making the necessary due diligence to properly evaluate the risks involved in 
crowdfunding. From mismanagement to outright scams, the disadvantage of a more democratized and 
young venture financing system is that the risk of failure and default of crowdfunding projects is often 
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much higher for backers. This section will discuss the risks involved in reward-based and subscription-
based crowdfunding, as well as the differences for their respective parties.  
Theoretically, reward-based crowdfunding benefits both the fundraisers and the backers; 
allowing fundraisers to fund their business, and providing backers a chance to purchase innovative 
products at a discounted price before the product comes out on the market. Nevertheless, such a model is 
intrinsically risky for backers. Backers, who may not have the ability to evaluate the risks and prospects 
of projects like venture capitalists, are vulnerable to “false signals sent by entrepreneurs seeking funds”, 
“inability to assess the signals correctly” and “fraudulent schemes”, which are all part of the risks 
inherent to the characteristically high information asymmetry for reward-based crowdfunding campaigns 
(Firoozi et al., 2016). Kickstarter has disclaimed that, “Kickstarter does not guarantee projects or 
investigate a creator's ability to complete their project. On Kickstarter, backers (you!) ultimately decide 
the validity and worthiness of a project by whether they decide to fund it.” (Kickstarter, 2018d)  
While Kickstarter had stated clearly in its terms of use that “when a project is successfully 
funded, the [fundraiser] must complete the project and fulfill each reward. Once a [fundraiser] has done 
so, they‟ve satisfied their obligation to their backers.” (Kickstarter, 2018b) The majority of backers are 
often individuals who contributes amounts of pledge that is often not too high, and the fundraisers too 
small for entities to pursue legal recourse such as class action lawsuits, especially since the backers are 
often across different legal jurisdiction or countries. Therefore, it is often a situation of “buyers beware” 
for backers as they bear full risks of their crowdfunding investments. However it is important to note 
that in 2015, Washington State, United States of America had ruled against a fundraiser for failure to 
deliver his crowdfunding project on time, making this the first successful legal enforcement of 
crowdfunding promise (Heminway, 2017). Of course, the fact that the ruling is only enforced in the 
Washington State highlighted the complex and fragmented situation for backers to seek legal protection 
over fraudulent projects.  
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Common sense dictates that, “the more complex the project, the higher the possibility of failure” 
(Prindle, 2018). Therefore it is simple to say that backers can lower their risks in investment by 
supporting simple projects that have higher success rates. However, usually it is the more complex 
projects that are more attractive, and this is where the problem usually comes when there is an 
information asymmetry between project fundraisers and backers (Wessel, 2016). Since most projects on 
crowdfunding platforms are still in their infancy, it is difficult to evaluate the prospects of the project 
outcome. This is further exacerbated when backers do not have access to publicly available information 
about the product and are not fully informed about the competence or reputation of the fundraisers. This 
situation allows fundraisers to overstate quality or hide information as they are the ones who are in 
control of what to show to potential backers (Mavlanova, 2012). A research by Mollick (2015) that looks 
at the delivery rates of Kickstarter projects shows that up to 9% of projects fail to deliver as promised to 
their backers, this of course does not account for fundraisers that delivered subpar products.  
With high levels of information asymmetry, backers are often unable to evaluate the reputation 
and reliability of the fundraisers. In some cases, even when the product to be invested is simple and 
therefore has a low risk of failure, many backers have fallen into the traps of fundraisers‟ fraudulent 
schemes. In August 2016, a company called Backzips launched a campaign on Kickstarter 
(https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/106898073/hidden-zipper-waterproof-and-kevlar-reinforced-
bac/comments?cursor=16228438), with a goal of raising US$35,000, to sell backpacks designed to keep 
users‟ belongings secure. With great campaign, they were able to raise US$159,476 from Kickstarter and 
US$9,001 more on another reward-based crowdfunding platform, Indiegogo. However, at the end 
backers never received their pledge rewards, as shipping date was postponed twice and later the 
fundraisers disappeared with no updates. Eventually, it was found that the fundraisers had run off with 
the money raised without shipping the product that was promised to the backers (Avner, 2017). Of 
course, such blatant fraud is not common. More often, the fundraisers were simply too inexperienced to 
make the venture work after gaining the funds.  
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Due to this risk, backers must assume the responsibility of due diligence. However, without 
much available information or experience and knowledge to properly evaluate each project like a 
venture capitalist would, backers instead look for signals of quality. Some studies have shown that 
signals of project quality have significant effect on the success of crowdfunding projects (Ahlers et al, 
2015; Mollick, 2014). Based on Mollick‟s (2014) exploratory empirical study, which drew on dataset 
from over 48,500 Kickstarter projects, it was found that crowdfunding success is highly correlated to the 
underlying quality of a project and the number of friends on online social networks. Results from the 
study suggests that the key to demonstrate quality is to include videos and provide frequent updates, and 
having spelling errors on a project‟s campaign is a signal of low quality. In fact, Kickstarter itself 
suggest that “a video is by far the best way to get a feel for the emotions, motivations, and character of a 
project. It‟s a demonstration of effort and a good predictor of success.”(O‟Connell and Kurtz, 2012) 
Therefore, backers may see the inclusion of a project video as a measure of basic project quality. In 
another study, the authors investigated the determinants of online behavior using the elaboration 
likelihood model, which considers the central and peripheral routes as influences of online behavior (Bi 
et al., 2017). In their model, they defined signals of project quality as the central route and electronic 
word of mouth as the peripheral route. Similar to Mollick (2014), they found that both routes have 
almost similar effects on backers‟ investment decision, and thus the success of a project (Bi et al., 
2017).   
Subscription-based crowdfunding is fundamentally different. Despite being the offshoot of 
reward-based crowdfunding, the risks involved in subscription-based campaigns are observed to be 
relatively lower. This is in large part due to the lower information asymmetry. Unlike reward-based 
projects where the crowdfunding campaign is one-off, Patreon campaign is usually a support financing 
structure for an ongoing brand, such as a YouTube channel or podcast. In such circumstances, the 
Creator has been producing content and growing his or her brand. The fans that would even visit the 
Creator‟s Patreon are therefore familiar with the Creator‟s works and way of working, and want to 
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financially contribute to the continuation of the Creator‟s works. The Creator has also a public track 
record of competence to deliver at least what he/she has been producing currently. 
As for the Creators, subscription-based model incentivizes a long and perpetuating campaign. 
Unlike reward-based crowdfunding that pays a large lump sum, subscription-based crowdfunding pays a 
relatively moderate or smaller amount of money per period, therefore it would be pointless for a Creator 
to simply disappear with the money like in the case of Backzips. Most of the value of a Creator lies in its 
brand image. Patreon is a way to diversify a Creator‟s revenue stream. Therefore if one were to ruin 
his/her reputation with fraud, the Creator‟s career across the industry would be ruined. A reward-based 
fundraiser, however, could disappear into anonymity. 
Finally, the risks for Patrons are limited due to the relatively small amount they dole out each 
period. In reward-based crowdfunding, a backer must commit a substantial amount of money to be able 
to get at least the basic product promised in the project proposal, therefore a failure in the project meant 
losing a larger amount of money than with subscription-based where the donation amounts are 
comparatively smaller. The Patron may also cancel anytime to cut loss, whereas a backer must request a 
refund after the campaign is over and the fundraiser might not even comply. In addition, the rewards 
promised in the reward-tiers are often easier to produce and can be delivered quickly. Reward-based 
crowdfunding projects are often innovative and complicated products, so a backer must wait for it to be 
developed, manufactured and delivered, often taking at least 6 months. Patreon campaigns often promise 
rewards that are either digital like additional content, online meeting with the Creator, or access to 
private discussion boards, which can be delivered frequently; or simple gifts, such as mugs, t-shirts or 
other small crafts that are easy to produce and quick to send.  
Section 3.3. Price discrimination 
One of the main features of crowdfunding, especially of reward-based and subscription-based 
models, is the flexibility in financing afforded to fundraisers and backers. Backers can contribute the 
amount that they are comfortable with while fundraisers can have greater control over the motivation 
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and rewards they provide in exchange for funding. In economics and business terms, this degree of 
freedom is “price discrimination”. This interplay between fundraiser and backer is an interesting part of 
crowdfunding and a point of research for many scholars (Belleflamme et al., 2014; Lukkarinen et al., 
2016; Mollick, 2016; Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2017). While reward-based and subscription-based 
crowdfunding models share many properties, the differences in users and ecosystem between the two 
models means that the characteristics of price discrimination between fundraisers and backers, and 
Creators and Patrons are worthy of exploring. 
Price discrimination refers to the practice of charging different prices for the same goods and/or 
services (Stole, 2007). It is commonly distinguished into three types: first-degree, second-degree and 
third-degree discrimination. First-degree price discrimination, or alternatively known as perfect price 
discrimination, arises when a monopoly seller charges the maximum possible price to each consumer, at 
a price that each consumer is willing to pay for the product. Second-degree price discrimination refers to 
the charging of different prices for different units consumed, usually happens when consumers gain 
discounts from buying more units of a good and/or services. Third-degree price discrimination happens 
when different groups of consumers are charged differently for the same goods and/ or services based on 
consumer characteristics such as age, religion status, etc. (Hardy, 2013).      
Hardy (2013) postulated that reward-based crowdfunding utilized both first and second degree 
price discrimination. Reward-based crowdfunding platforms adopt a pay-what-you-want model whereby 
backers pay the exact price at which they judge the marginal benefits equal to its marginal costs (Png, 
2002). Some backers may even be willing to increase their payment just to ensure the success of a 
campaign that they support (Hardy, 2013). Based on non-materialistic incentives, such as the 
aforementioned altruism and social belonging, backers would pledge an amount of their choosing to 
support a campaign, indicating that backers are subjected to first degree price discrimination. While this 
tends to encourage more people to participate in the crowdfunding (Cadsby and Maynes, 1999), it may 
have an undesirable consequence of decreased average payment (Hardy, 2013). This disadvantage, 
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though, is usually not observed in crowdfunding campaigns that are altruistic or non-profit in nature 
(Gneezy et al., 2010). To motivate higher individual pledge amount, fundraisers would set reward tiers 
to provide additional rewards in return for higher donation. In many ways, reward-based crowdfunding 
is also a case of public good vs private gift. The campaign and its success as a whole exceeds the 
personal level of the individual backer and thus could be seen as a public good whereas the material gifts 
promised by the fundraiser in exchange for certain levels of pledges after the project succeeds could be 
seen as private gift (Varian, 2013). As such, reward-based crowdfunding would tie public good, the 
campaign, with private gifts, rewards, to better motivate more people to donate more money (Varian, 
2013). As mentioned previously, reward tiers would promise additional benefits the higher the donation 
is, and often these benefits are of increasingly higher material value. The most often case is a lower 
reward tier, for example $50 for 1 unit of product and a higher tier promising $70 for two products.  In 
some cases, fundraisers may even promise additional rewards once a certain collective goal has been 
reached, and therefore motivates backers to pay more for even more benefits (Steigenberger, 2016). 
Thus, most reward-based crowdfunding campaigns also possess second degree price discrimination 
(Hardy, 2013). All in all, backers in reward-based crowdfunding are affected by both first and second 
degree price discrimination, the degree of which the backers are more exposed to is hard to determine as 
a whole. 
At the current state, a look into the top 20 subscription-based crowdfunding campaigns across 
different categories strongly suggests that subscription-based crowdfunding predominantly exhibit 
characteristics of first degree price discrimination. The difference lies in that, broadly speaking, reward-
based crowdfunding projects are essentially business proposals promising future goods and services, 
whereas subscription-based crowdfunding campaigns are proposals for a periodic sponsorship of an 
ongoing project. In other words, a backer pledge to the fundraiser‟s promise of future goods as stipulated 
by the reward tiers; a Patron‟s pledge to support the longevity of a Creator‟s output. Also using the pay-
what-you-want model, the Patron can enter the exact amount he/she is willing to contribute per month or 
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per creation. The Creator also may encourage higher individual pledge with reward tiers. However with 
subscription-based crowdfunding campaigns, the benefits do not have a correspondingly higher material 
or market value with each higher tier. For a non-fan, the benefits are of no value, however for an avid 
supporter, the benefits may be of immeasurable value. In short, the Creator is charging each Patron the 
maximum amount they are individually willing to pay for the creative work the Creator produces. 
Of course, with the existing framework for subscription-based crowdfunding platforms like 
Patreon, there are definitely possibilities for other models of campaigns that use other degrees of price 
discrimination in tandem. One such example would be for dance classes, where the reward tiers are 
basically courses with each course having tangible value 
(https://www.patreon.com/serpentinestudies/memberships). The 6 USD tier will give Patrons access to 3 
instructional videos per month and a 2 hour video course, the 12 USD tier will give Patrons full access to 
all videos and a 3 month training program and a custom pledge that allows one to pledge any amount 
he/she wants without any rewards. Different from the models mentioned before, the focus is not so much 
on the fan and creator engagement but the acquisition of dance lessons that have referable market value 
elsewhere. This example is very similar to the reward-based crowdfunding model where first and second 
degree discrimination are both used.   
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CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Crowdfunding is a valuable alternative source of financing, and has become an important 
practice of funding for new projects and ventures. Reward-based crowdfunding model has proven to 
successfully match entrepreneurs directly to their target market, but is unsuitable for projects that operate 
on an ongoing basis such as media content creation. As an answer to this, subscription-based 
crowdfunding is a new and exciting phenomenon that seeks to bring traditional method of funding 
continuous publication like newspaper subscription to the online age. This innovative form of 
crowdfunding fulfilled the financial need of online content creators who seek to diversify their revenue 
stream, increase creative freedom, and to detach from the disadvantages of advertising-based revenue 
system.  
This thesis is serves as an exploratory study of subscription-based crowdfunding. As one of the 
first academic foray into this new model of crowdfunding, this paper provides a comprehensive study of 
how subscription-based crowdfunding functions and a generalized description of the predominant 
Creators on the platform at the time of writing. This paper uses reward-based crowdfunding to 
benchmark with subscription-based crowdfunding to better understand subscription-based 
crowdfunding‟s place in the market. Since one of the purposes of subscription-based crowdfunding is to 
compete with the near-monopoly of advertising economy of the online media market, the thesis also 
provides a brief study into advertising-revenue model used by the major media platforms on the internet, 
specifically YouTube. In doing so, the paper can illustrate how subscription-based crowdfunding 
provides a viable financing method for individual content creators. 
Subscription-based crowdfunding had stemmed from reward-based crowdfunding. Though it 
may share many similar mechanisms as its predecessor, subscription-based crowdfunding caters to a 
different market in a manner that is irreplaceable by any current known models of crowdfunding. 
Subscription-based crowdfunding‟s feature of scheduled funding fundamentally alters the way the model 
works in a way that differentiates itself to a higher degree than the difference between donation-based 
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and reward-based crowdfunding. Therefore, this study concludes that subscription-based crowdfunding 
should be considered not just a subset of reward-based crowdfunding but categorized as its own model 
under community crowdfunding, defined as a separate but equal model as donation and reward-based 
crowdfunding.  
Furthermore, subscription-based crowdfunding offers enough market potential that a separate 
classification would be important for further industrial and academic investigation. The recent 
adpocalypse highlighted the disadvantage of having advertising-revenue model as the dominant revenue 
stream in the online media ecology. In turn, the current trend is shifting towards paid subscriptions. 
Netflix, Hulu and even New York Times had shown great financial results as the market seeks 
alternatives to get content without the distraction of advertisements (Gilbreath, 2017). In the ecology of 
user-generated contents, new monetization has been gaining traction. In 2017, Patreon raised 60 million 
USD and reached more than $150 million USD pledges from a million users to support 50,000 Creators. 
The market also observed many existing large players moving into the subscription-based crowdfunding 
market. Kickstarter, one of the largest and most prominent reward-based crowdfunding platforms, 
bought Drip, a subscription-based crowdfunding platform, in 2015 and relaunched it in November 2017 
(Chen, 2017). According to Kickstarter, “...Drip is a tool for people to fund and build community around 
their ongoing creative practice”, and that “a key mandate for the design of Drip has been creator 
independence” (Chen, 2017). YouTube itself launched a beta test for its own subscription function, 
called “channel membership” in June 2018 (YouTube, 2018e). Having these new developments 
happening this shortly after the start of the adpocalypse strongly suggest that the existing players in both 
crowdfunding and media platform understood this market potential for subscription-based model and the 
risk of over-reliance on advertising revenue model. Thus, the subscription-based crowdfunding industry 
may be experiencing an upward momentum in both mainstream attention and capital injection. 
On the flip side, subscription-based crowdfunding model does have flaws and limitations that 
must be addressed. As a model, subscription-based crowdfunding relies on the Creator‟s branding to 
 37   
 
draw Patrons into a platform. Just as with any platforms, subscription-based crowdfunding platforms 
such as Patreon or Drip establish their competitive advantage through network effect. For the platform, 
early growth and accumulation of Creators, especially those with a large established fan base and brand 
name, is crucial for the construction of economic moat. A Creator will gravitate to the most dominant, 
thus perceived as the most reliable, platform; and a Creator would not benefit from building more 
campaigns on other subscription-based platforms because his or her fan base is finite and increasing 
exposure will only confuse and divide Patrons. This is in stark contrast to reward-based crowdfunding 
where more campaigns on various platforms means increased exposure. As an industry, it may become a 
winner-takes-all market, where an early entrant that is able to build a large enough user base will 
become the default platform for content creators to host their subscription campaigns. This has been 
witnessed by YouTube in the online video media platform. 
 Yet, as mentioned, subscription-based crowdfunding does not easily facilitate browsing; the 
Patron supports a Creator he or she has known for some time and has a certain degree of devotion. 
Therefore, the network effect of a subscription-based crowdfunding platform may lose a degree of 
interconnectedness compared to that of reward-based crowdfunding or YouTube. Patrons would not 
share their favorite Creator‟s Patreon campaign on other social media since non-fans would not be able 
to understand. This, in turn, places a restriction on the growth rate of a subscription crowdfunding 
platform.  
For third-party subscription-based crowdfunding platforms like Patreon and Drip, YouTube‟s 
channel membership may pose a major hurdle. Many of Patreon‟s largest Creators are YouTube creators. 
The channel membership system will provide fans with fewer steps to contribute to creators. This 
seamless financing option provided by YouTube will be a more convenient and default way for fans to 
support content creators, third-party subscription crowdfunding services may be seen as more inferior 
method of fan financing. With YouTube‟s size and scale, this may further limit the growth of 
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subscription-based crowdfunding platforms and relegate this form of financing to less mainstream 
fringes of popular online media. 
At the moment, subscription-based crowdfunding is poised to have significant impact on both 
the crowdfunding and online media industries. With the lack of academic papers on the subject of 
subscription-based crowdfunding at the time of writing, this thesis makes several contributions to the 
academic literature. First, it establishes a codified record of the function and purpose of current day 
subscription-based crowdfunding. Second, the paper ties the relationship between subscription-based 
crowdfunding and online media against the context of the current shift in online media market. As for 
practical implications, this paper provides a clear understanding of the principle differences between the 
three main financing methods available for and entrepreneurs content creators: reward-based 
crowdfunding, subscription-based crowdfunding and advertising-based revenue. The information 
provided here can hopefully give insights to aspiring entrepreneurs and content creators as to which form 
of financing best suits his or her business model.  
Overall, this thesis provides one of the first insights into subscription-based crowdfunding and 
has important implications to both research and practice. In addition, it also provides an overview of 
how it fits into the greater market of venture financing and online media. However, it has a number of 
limitations that need to be considered. First and foremost, as with exploratory studies, this paper opted to 
use non-participant observation, literary analysis of academic papers, industry reports, and news reports. 
Therefore, while it gave a wide perspective of the topic and related ecosystem, the paper had to simplify 
and generalize many intricate subjects that deserve in-depth study. Second, this study lacks substantial 
and quantitative data analysis and therefore does not allow for a highly objective analysis interpretation 
of data. This combined with the data collection method of non-participant observation, some bias may be 
inevitable and must be taken into account when interpreting the results in this study. Third, with the 
topic at hand being relatively nascent, a lack of academic literature is available for subscription-based 
crowdfunding. Additionally, since the development in the online mediascape is still too new, many 
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sources used for this research were fathered from news report, industry articles, and even primary and 
secondary sources, thus this paper may be subject to recency bias filtered from the short time span and 
subjective sources. To address these limitations, a quantitative data sampling and analysis of Patron 
motivations and incentives may be an interesting future subject to explore.  
Despite the limitations, this study serves as an initial step towards understanding the new and 
emerging phenomenon of subscription-based crowdfunding. The author hopes that these findings can 
provide a foundation for future studies to build upon. 
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